Posts tagged Case Summaries

Superior Court: Oral Contract Created By Contractor's Representations

 

MAA Real Estate LLC v. Patel, C.A. No. 06C-02-249 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2007).

In this breach of contract action, there was no written agreement, only an unsigned pricing sheet prepared by the contractor making the repairs. The court had to determine whether the parties nonetheless mutually assented to any of the terms on the sheet or otherwise entered into an oral contract.

The court held that there was no mutual assent to the items on the pricing sheet, as it did not state the specific materials required to complete the renovation. The customer could only show that the contractor represented that he would install non-skid tile flooring. That created an oral contract. By failing to install non-skid tile, the contractor breached the agreement.

The measure of damages was the cost of replacement and repair for the proper flooring.

 

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Superior Court: Employer Owes No Duty to Employee's Spouse

In re: Asbestos Litig., 2007 WL 4571196 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2007).

In this negligence action, a wife alleged that she was exposed to asbestos while laundering her husband’s work clothes. The employer moved for summary judgment, claiming it owed no duty to an employee’s spouse who had never set foot on company property and had only been injured as a result of take-home exposure.  This argument presented an issue of first impression in Delaware. 

In addressing the core question of when a duty of care arises, the court conducted a review of the doctrinal approaches advanced throughout the history of tort law, from Cardozo’s foreseeability analysis to Learned Hand’s B<PL formula. The court observed that none of these approaches had been adopted in Delaware to the exclusion of the others. Instead, it was up to the court to consider the relationship of the parties in each particular case in light of its peculiar facts.
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Superior Court Grants Motion to Amend Answer, Even Though Defendant Had Some Knowledge of New Fact Before Filing

Delta Eta Corp. v. University of Delaware, 2007 WL 4578278 (Del. Super. Ct., Dec. 27, 2007).

This decision addresses a party’s ability to amend its answer, under Rule 15(a), when the 20-day period to amend as a matter of right has expired. The litigation arose when the University of Delaware terminated a lease it entered into with a fraternity to maintain a chapter house and then took title to the property, triggering a requirement under the agreement that it pay the fraternity the fair market value of the remainder of its leasehold interest.

In its answer, UD admitted that it owed the amount determined by a neutral appraiser to be the value of the interest. But when the fraternity moved for summary judgment, UD moved to amend its answer to deny that the amount was accurate. UD argued that it learned of severe mold damage to the chapter house that should have been taken into account in the valuation.
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Court of Chancery Sets Fees for Supplemental Proxy Materials

In re James River Group Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. No. 3173-VCL ( January 8, 2008).

Here, the court awarded $400,000 in fees in connection with the settlement of a class action when the relief obtained was a supplement to the proxy statement.

While the company claimed it was always going to send the supplemental materials, the court noted that was contrary to the recital in the settlement agreement. Seems like it is not good to go back on your word in Chancery Court.

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Court of Chancery Requires Disclosure By Special Committee

Ryan v. Gifford, C.A. No. 2213-CC (January 2, 2008).

This is an interesting decision because it points out how to do almost everything wrong in using a special committee to investigate accusations of misconduct. The result is that any privilege from disclosure that the work of the special committee may have enjoyed was completely lost and all of its extensive efforts were ordered to be turned over to the plaintiffs in the underlying litigation.

The decision also points out the limits on what its holding may have been in other contexts where the special committee's work was properly used and its privileges maintained.

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Court of Chancery Explains Contract Interpretation Rules

United Rentals Inc v. RAM Holdings Inc. C.A. No. 3360-CC (December 12 and 21, 2007). 

In these two decisions the Court of Chancery sets out how it will interpret a contract. Following the objective theory of contract interpretation, the court searches for the "common understanding" of the parties. It will not hear evidence of a party's subjective mental impressions or unilateral understandings.

However, the court will apply the "Forthright Negotiator Principle" when a contract is ambiguous. Under that approach, a reasonable interpretation of contract language of one of the parties will be binding on the other party to the contract if he knew or should have known of the other party's understanding and did not object to it when the contract was signed. Silence then may be fatal.

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Court of Chancery Upholds Statute of Repose for Dissolved Corporations

The Territory Of The Virgin Islands v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., C.A. No. 2505-VCS (December 20, 2007).

This decision upholds the law that Section 278 of the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL") acts as a statute of repose to bar the filing of all litigation against a Delaware corporation after 3 years from the date of its dissolution.

As the court also notes, that means that a suit against stockholders under Section 325 of the DGCL for having received an improper liquidating distribution are also precluded under those circumstances.

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Court of Chancery Explains Scope of Arbitration Agreement

Brown v. T-Ink, LLC ,C.A. No. 3190-VCP (December 18, 2007) Delaware courts have recently issued several decisions dealing with the scope of an agreement to arbitrate. This is yet another. The opinion is interesting for its explanation of the Delaware approach to determining whether it is for the arbitrator or the court to decide if an issue is subject to arbitration. Generally, that issue will be decided by the court unless there is a clear indication in the agreement that the arbitrator is to decide such questions. As this decision points out, references to the AAA rules and language including "all controversies" arising out of the parties' relationship indicate that an arbitrator should decide such issues. Share

Court of Chancery Holds Board Meeting Is Void

Fogel v. U.S. Energy Systems, Inc., C.A. No. 3271-CC (December 13, 2007).

Directors often think that if they get together that is a real board of directors'  meeting. Not so. As this decision holds, a board meeting is a formal event that must be preceded by the appropriate notice, be conducted by voting on the issues and otherwise be properly called and conducted. Gatherings of even all the directors that do not meet these tests are void.

Moreover, the consequence of holding a meeting void is that actions taken cannot be ratified later. Thus, even when all but one of the company's directors wanted to fire the CEO, their attempt to do so at a haste gathering of all the directors was ineffective.

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Superior Court: Equitable Counterclaim Does Not Equal Ticket to Chancery

Rembrandt Technologies, LP v. Harris Corp., 2007 WL 4237752 (Del. Super. Nov. 30, 2007). 

This decision demonstrates the willingness of Delaware courts to uphold the plaintiff’s choice of forum (between the Superior Court and the Court of Chancery), despite an argument by the defendant that transferring courts would allow the hearing of all claims and thus promote judicial economy.  More ›

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Court of Chancery Dismisses Merger Claims

Globis Partners LP v. Plumtree Software, Inc., C.A. No. 1577-VCP (November 30, 2007).

This decision explains why some attacks on a merger fail for want of a basis to avoid the business judgment rule and for a failure to make proper disclosure claims. The merger was a third-party transaction and the defendant directors received no unique benefit as a result. The Court held that granting those directors a right to indemnification, an acceleration of options and a cash out of vested options, did not constitute a special benefit that would make the directors interested parties. Hence, the business judgment rule applied.

The court also concluded that the complaint's disclosure claims lacked merit. For the most part, those claims were attacks on the merits of the investment banker's analysis attached to the proxy statement. That is not a claim of inadequate disclosure. Thus, the complaint was dismissed.

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Court of Chancery Upholds Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Attorney

Sample v. Morgan, C.A. No. 1214-VCS (November 27, 2007).

In this major decision, the Court of Chancery has upheld its jurisdiction over a non-Delaware attorney who is alleged to have aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty by directors. Given the breadth of this decision, it has major implications for counsel to Delaware corporations.

First, the Court held that the attorney's arranging for the filing of a certificate with the Delaware Secretary of State satisfied the single act required to permit service of process on the attorney and his law firm under the Delaware Long Arm Statute. That is nothing new under Delaware law as other decisions have held that filing of such a certificate meets the statutory requirement for service.

Second, the Court held, in what may prove to be its most controversial decision, that Due Process was satisfied in subjecting the attorney to jurisdiction by a Delaware court. Noting that this "is a highly unusual case", the Court had no problem holding that giving advice on Delaware law and controlling the course of litigation in Delaware justified subjecting the attorney to jurisdiction here. What may prove to be controversial, however, are sections of the opinion that suggest that regularly providing advice on Delaware corporate law is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Due Process in asserting jurisdiction over the non-Delaware lawyer for claims arising out of that advice.

Finally, the opinion holds that an attorney may be held liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty when he knows his advice is being used to carry out the breach. This is important because the knowledge requirement may be satisfied when the lawyer claims expertise in Delaware law and his advice is wrong. The inference then is that he knows his advice is wrong. While this seems to go too far, it is not clear how far the logic of the opinion may be stretched by other courts.

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Superior Court Holds Date-of-Discovery Rule Does Not Toll Statute of Limitations in Legal Malpractice Action When Evidence Indicates Knowledge of Facts Relevant to Claim

Boerger v. Heiman, 2007 WL 3378667 (Del. Super. Oct. 31, 2007)

The three-year statute of limitations under 10 Del. C. § 8106, which begins to run at the time of the alleged breach in the case of a contract claim and at the time the injury occurs for a tort claim, may be tolled by, among other circumstances, the absence of observable factors that would place a layman on notice. This exception is called the date of discovery rule. When it applies, the statute of limitations begins to run when the defect is or should have been discovered.

In this legal malpractice action, the Superior Court held that the statute of limitations expired prior to the filing of the complaint and that it was not tolled because “multiple factors and plaintiff’s own statements indicate knowledge of the relevant facts which establish a potential claim . . . .” The plaintiff argued that the defendant attorneys fraudulently concealed his potential tax liability, but based on the evidence, the court concluded that the plaintiff should have discovered this fact, at the very least, by the time he hired an independent consultant who brought the matter to his attention. 

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Supreme Court: When Standing is Closely Related to Merits, 12(b)(6) Applies, Not 12(b)(1)

Appriva Shareholder Litig. Co., LLC v. EV3, Inc., -- A.2d --, 2007 WL 3208783 (Del. Nov. 1, 2007)

Deciding whether a motion to dismiss based on lack of standing is considered under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(b)(1) has implications and has divided some courts. First, lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 12(b)(1) is non-waivable and can be raised by the court sua sponte, whereas failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6) must be raised by motion. Second, a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim may be converted to a motion for summary judgment, considering matters outside the pleadings, but a 12(b)(1) motion may not. In this consolidated appeal, the Supreme Court held that when the issue of standing is closely related to the merits, a motion to dismiss for lack of standing is properly considered under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  More ›

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Court of Chancery Limits Jurisdiction Over Officers

Ryan v. Gifford, C.A. No. 2213-CC (November 21, 2007).

In 2003, Delaware amended its long arm statute to cover corporate officers who served in that capacity after January 1, 2004. Past decisions under the director section of this statute have focused on when a defendant is subject to it for acts committed before the date the statute deems the defendant's holding a corporate office is consent to jurisdiction by a Delaware court. Consistent with that case law, this decision holds that prior bad acts do not constitute continuing wrongs that subject the defendant to Delaware jurisdiction after January 1, 2004.

Of course, the decision also holds that there are acts some of the defendants committed before that date which were further implemented after that date and that may subject them to jurisdiction. For example, receiving a back dated option before January 1, 2004 does not subject the officer to jurisdiction in Delaware unless after that date he commits further acts, such as concealing that the option was back dated.

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