Posts tagged Case Summaries

Court of Chancery Reviews Class Representative Qualifications

In re SS&C Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. No. 1525-VCL (March 6, 2008)

For a long time it has been evident that some plaintiffs show up frequently as class representatives. The recent scandal involving perhaps the major securities class action law firm has only reminded everyone of the odd "coincidence" that one person could have so many class actions to bring. Now the Court of Chancery has done something about it and a warning has been issued as a result. This decision awarded attorney fees to the defendants in a man-bites-dog twist to the ending of a class action.

Of course, the facts in this case are highly unusual. When the named plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to have the court approve a settlement basically for attorney fees alone, he then tried to just dismiss the case, conditioned upon defendants' agreement to keep certain information confidential. Instead, the defendants fought back and discovered the named class representative had a string of investment entities that in turn owned very small stakes in many publicly owned corporations. No rational financial purpose justified these investments, except as a way to pursue law suits. When the plaintiff conditioned settlement on secrecy, the court held that was bad faith and awarded attorney fees to the defendants for resisting such a dismissal.

It is now likely that we will see much more aggressive pursuit of oppositions to class certifications. Discovery of the named plaintiff and his connections to the class counsel will be the new trend. As this decision illustrates, the ability to do data searches to find all the actions filed by a plaintiff and any law firm will also aid in that effort.

 

 

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Court of Chancery Denies Standing For Lost Shares

Postorivo v. AG Paintball Holdings Inc., C.A. No. 2991-VCP (Del. Ch. February 29, 2008)

It has long been recognized that a stockholder may lose her standing to bring derivative litigation by losing her shares in a merger.  There is a recognized exception to this rule for mergers designed just to eliminate derivative litigation.

Here, the plaintiff  sold the assets of his company in return for cash and stock in the buyer. The stock was held in escrow and when a dispute arose, the buyer revoked the stock as compensation for its claims against the seller. When the seller brought a derivative suit, the court dismissed it as he no longer owned stock in the buyer. Thus, the court refused to make another exception to the rule that a derivative plaintiff must continue to be a stockholder through out the litigation.

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Court of Chancery Interprets Indenture

Wilmington Trust Co. v. Tropicana Entertainment LLC, C.A. 3502-VCN (Del. Ch. February 29, 2008)

The Court of Chancery rarely interprets bond indentures; so in the spirit of the date of this decision, the Court did so here. What is particularly interesting about this case is the way the Court reasoned to the result. While focusing on the specific language of the indenture, the Court did not hesitate to apply that language to circumstances that probably were not considered by the drafters. In this very un-Justice Scalia way, the Court held the indenture was violated.

The lesson here is that the Court is very realistic about what language should mean in the business world. It will not be swayed by hyper-technical interpretations that are not what the drafters would have said had they focused on the circumstances at hand. This does not mean that the Court will stretch language beyond what it really means, however. Instead, a sort of middle ground of interpretation is the mark of Delaware law in this regard.

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Delaware Supreme Court Rules That Directors Lack Standing to Bring Derivative Suits

Schoon v. Smith, C.A. No. 554, 2006 (Del. Feb. 12, 2008).

In an important ruling, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld bedrock principles of Delaware corporate law and governance and rejected plaintiff’s argument that directors of Delaware corporations should have standing to bring derivative suits on behalf of companies upon whose boards they sit.

In Schoon, Plaintiff Richard Schoon was a director of Troy Corporation. He was elected to the Troy board by the Series B stockholder, Steel, which had the right to appoint one member to a five member board. Schoon himself owned no Troy shares but rather acted at the behest of Steel. Schoon brought derivative claims purportedly on behalf of Troy alleging breaches of fiduciary duty by his fellow board members.  Steel had also sought books and records pursuant to Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”).

The defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Schoon lacked standing to assert such derivative claims. The Court of Chancery agreed and dismissed the action. The Court of Chancery relied upon well established precedent, albeit precedent that had never been tested at the Supreme Court level. Schoon appealed. More ›

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District Court Finds Insurance Policy Language Precludes Breach Claim, But Estoppel and Waiver Claims Survive

Drexel v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 2008 WL 356938 (D.Del. Feb. 11, 2008)

Here the District Court evaluated a claim from an insured that a denial of coverage based on policy expiration constituted a breach of contract. The insured owned a property that sustained fire damage, and submitted a claim to Defendant, his insurer. The policy required annual renewal, but the insured did not submit the payment required for renewal until after both the policy expiration date and the subsequent grace period. However, the insured submitted his claim during the grace period, such that Defendant began to process the request and retain an adjuster and contractor. Defendant subsequently determined that the policy had expired prior to the insured’s claimed damages, and the insured had not submitted payment during the grace period. Defendant therefore denied coverage, and the insured sued on a theory of breach of contract, estoppel, and waiver. Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims, while the insured moved for summary judgment on the breach claim.  More ›

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District Court Grants Summary Judgment on Consumer Fraud, Breach Claims

Millett v. Truelink, Inc., 2008 WL 345937 (D.Del. Feb. 7, 2008)

In this opinion the District Court granted the provider of a credit report monitoring service summary judgment on claims that it violated state consumer protection provisions and contractual obligations. Plaintiffs, who were spouses, had purchased a subscription to Defendant’s service, and alleged that Defendant failed to alert them to activity that resulted from theft of the husband’s social security number. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant had violated Kansas’ Consumer Protection Act (“KCPA”) as well as breached the Credit Monitoring Member Agreement (“Member Agreement”) that Plaintiffs entered into when purchasing the service. Plaintiffs moved for class certification and summary judgment on their KCPA claims, and Defendant moved for summary judgment on the KCPA and several breach of contract claims. The Court found that neither the activity nor the advertising and marketing activities of Defendant were in violation of the KCPA provisions on unconscionable acts and practices, and Defendant was not in breach of the Member Agreement.  More ›

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Court of Chancery Explains Requirements For SLC Report

Sutherland v. Sutherland, C.A. No. 2399-VCL (February 14, 2008).

This is another decision that explains what must be done to have the report of a special litigation committee ("SLC") respected by the court. To begin with, the use of a single board member for the SLC "pressed the theory of Zapata to the extreme". Thus, one-member SLCs are generally not a good idea.

In addition, the report of an SLC needs to include sufficient detail to support its conclusions. It is better practice to include documentation of the report's conclusions, such as the documents it relied on, the interviews it conducted and the advice it received. This is controversial for a good reason. If the court refuses to dismiss the derivative litigation despite the SLC recommendation, then the report may serve as a roadmap for the plaintiff going forward.  Thus, the decision on whether to use a SLC should be considered carefully. There are still excellent reasons for using a SLC, but it must be done correctly.

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Court of Chancery Dismisses Suit Over Decision To Not Pursue A Merger

Gantler v. Stephens, C .A. No. 2392-VCP (February 14, 2008).

This decision illustrates the confusion that exists over the scope of review of a board's decision to not pursue a merger and largely eliminates the uncertainty. Briefly, the board here decided not to pursue a merger opportunity and the potential acquirer then withdrew its offer. The court held that the business judgment rule applied to the decision not to take the offer. In doing so, the court declined to apply the heightened scrutiny used under the Unocal decision as the board did not take any defensive steps to stop the suitor from going forward on its own.

Instead, the court held that to invoke a higher level of review, the plaintiff must show the board acted in bad faith or was not properly advised. Mere allegations that the board made the wrong decision are insufficient. More ›

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Court of Chancery Dismisses Complaint Based On Conjecture

Pfeffer v. Redstone, C.A. No. 2317-VCL (February 1, 2008).

At first this seems like a common disclosure case. It is more than that, however. The court here shows that it expects claims to be based on more than mere conjecture to survive a motion to dismiss. The Complaint alleged that the key corporate officers knew of a bad cash flow analysis but failed to disclose it in connection with an exchange offer. When the plaintiff''s counsel could not even say he had seen the alleged report or explain how it was disclosed to the defendant directors, the complaint was dismissed.

To support allegations of knowledge of a red flag, the allegation must be based on common sense or specific facts. It is common sense to infer the directors saw a report if it was common knowledge in the corporation and is a type of report that one would expect the board to have seen. It is not common sense to believe that an obscure memo generated by a lower level employee was shown to the board of a publicly traded corporation.

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District Court Finds That Participation in Delaware Merger Confers Jurisdiction, Denies Motion to Dismiss

G & G LLC v. White, 2008 WL 205150 (D. Del. Jan. 25, 2008)

In this opinion declining to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the District Court found that it had personal jurisdiction over both the directors/officers of a Delaware corporation and over a foreign corporation that invested in a Delaware corporation. Plaintiff was a Virginia limited liability company that loaned $2.5 million to a Utah corporation. Plaintiff was granted a security interest in the Utah corporation’s assets, and perfected that interest by filing the required financing statements in Utah. However, the Utah corporation subsequently was merged with and into a Delaware corporation. Plaintiff asserted that this was done at the insistence of various defendants that were seeking to invest in the Utah corporation after Plaintiff informed them that it would not agree to subordinate its security interest to theirs. Plaintiff posited that the investor defendants thereafter controlled the Utah corporation and the Delaware corporation it was merged into, and fraudulently concealed the merger to prevent Plaintiff from perfecting its security interest upon the merger, while at the same time perfecting their own in Delaware. Plaintiff pointed to numerous instances where the Utah corporation, the Delaware corporation, their counsel, the directors/officers of the Delaware corporation (who were appointed by the investor defendants), and the investor defendants failed to notify Plaintiff of the merger and/or made misrepresentations regarding the continuing status of the corporation as a Utah corporation. Taking the allegations as true, the Court found that the actions of the investor defendants and the directors they appointed was sufficient to confer specific jurisdiction over them.  More ›

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Superior Court Allows Expert Testimony On "Materiality" When Not An Ultimate Issue

Mizel v. Xenonics, Inc., 2008 WL 116203 (Del. Super. Jan. 11, 2008).

This decision addresses the question of whether an expert can testify as to materiality under the securities laws. The moving party argued that materiality was an ultimate issue in this breach of contract action and thus could not be the subject of expert testimony, citing Hill v. Equitable Banks, 1987 WL 8953 (D. Del. 1987), a case in which the ultimate issue was whether certain alleged misrepresentations and omissions were material. 

The court, however, distinguished this case from Hill, finding that materiality was not the core question before the jury. The critical issue was whether the plaintiff, a warrant holder, was prevented from exercising his purchase rights—a fact the company denied completely.    More ›

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Court of Chancery Grants Advancement to an Employee

Sassano v. CIBC World Markets Corp., C.A. No. 3066-VCL ( January 17, 2008).

It is not widely recognized that Delaware law permits a corporation to grant advancement of attorney fees to employees who are not directors and may even be fairly minor employees. Here, the bylaws provided advancement of fees for an officer with "management supervisory functions". The court carefully went over whether the plaintiff had those duties and found that he did and thus, should be advanced his fees for the defense of an SEC investigation.

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Court of Chancery Upholds Agreement To Agree

Pharmathene Inc. v. SIGA Technologies. Inc., C.A. No. 2627-VCP (January 16, 2008).

Whether an agreement to agree may be enforced seems like an odd question. After all, if the parties really had an agreement then why not just say so and not use a term sheet or other vague type of "agreement to agree" to express their intent. This decision illustrates just why that may occur because the parties apparently were uncertain if they really wanted to bind themselves to one another just yet. Nonetheless, they did list all the essential terms of what they wanted in their contract in a term sheet and when they seemed to have acted to carry out their deal, the court here indicated it will enforce an agreement to agree when to let one party walk away seems inequitable.

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Court of Chancery Defines Illegal Vote Buying

Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell International Inc., C.A. No. 3142-VCS (January 15, 2008).

This is the definitive decision on when arrangements to secure a stockholder's vote are invalid. "Vote buying" has long been criticized without much thought. After all, the Delaware General Corporation Code specifically authorizes arrangements to lock up a stockholder's vote. However, paying for that vote seems somehow wrong, perhaps because of political reasons. Here, the court carefully sets out the policy considerations and decides when paying for a vote is invalid.

In general, when a stockholder's agreement to cast his vote for management pursuant to a contract with the corporation is publicly announced, then it will be valid. If the other stockholders do not like it, then they can vote the other way. The exceptions to this are when corporate assets are used to buy the vote and then it becomes more troublesome. The arrangement will be struck down when it is not in furtherance of a proper corporate purpose and is unreasonable.

This decision also comments on how to conduct a stockholder meeting. Postponing votes by lying about why there is a delay is frowned upon, to say the least.

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Court of Chancery Orders Meeting For Bankrupt

Fogel v U.S. Energy Systems, Inc., C.A. No. 3271-CC (January 15, 2008).

This is another in a line of decisions holding that the Court of Chancery may order the holding of a stockholders' meeting even if the company is in a bankruptcy proceeding. The automatic stay does not apply.

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