Delaware Business Litigation Report

Chancery Addresses the Arbitration Versus “Expert” Determination Distinction in Acquisition Agreement

Agiliance Inc. v. Resolver SOAR LLC, C.A. No. 2018-0389-TMR (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2019).

Purchase agreements in M&A transactions often include alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.  It similarly is not uncommon for parties to debate whether their agreement contemplates arbitration or an “expert” determination.  There is a distinction between the two under Delaware law, and it is important.  In particular, it dictates what role a court can play, such as in determining the scope of the non-judicial adjudicator’s authority in the first instance. The Court of Chancery thoroughly addressed the issue last year in Penton Business Media Holdings, LLC v. Informa PLC, 2018 WL 3343495 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2018). This is another decision on that topic, one reading the parties’ contract as requiring arbitration, not an expert determination, citing the contract’s references to the process as “arbitration.”   

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Delaware Supreme Court Addresses Emails and Jurisdictional Use Conditions in Books and Records Actions

KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Technologies Inc., No. 281, 2018 (Del. Jan. 29, 2019) (Strine, Chief Justice).

Two prevailing questions for books and records inspections under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law are what records can I get, and what can I do with them? This decision from the Delaware Supreme Court addresses both issues. More ›

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Chancery Addresses Lawyer-Driven Effort Defense to Books and Records Inspection

Inter-Local Pension Fund GCC/IBT v. Calgon Carbon Corp., C.A. No. 2017-0910-MTZ (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2019).

It is sometimes fair to characterize plaintiff-side representative litigation in the corporate context as lawyer-driven. This decision is notable because it addresses how that dynamic might affect a stockholder’s right to inspect corporate books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. The right to access records is not a license to fish. A stockholder can get necessary records, for a proper purpose—one that is in fact the stockholder’s true and primary purpose. That is where a lawyer’s involvement might make a difference. The purposes stated by counsel might not align with the stockholder’s actual motivations. More ›

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Court of Chancery Grants Preliminary Injunction Based on Insider’s Stock Issuances to Himself

Applied Energetics, Inc. v. Farley, C.A. No. 2018-0489-TMR (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2019).

This opinion addresses two bedrock issues of Delaware corporate law, specifically, proper board authorization under 8 Del. C. § 141 and directors’ fiduciary duty of loyalty.  Following other directors’ resignations, defendant George Farley was the only director as of February 2016 of plaintiff Applied Energetics (the “Company”).  Shortly after becoming the sole director, Farley executed a written consent to issue himself twenty million shares of Applied Energetics stock for $.001 per share.  No contemporaneous valuation was performed, and Farley made no attempts to ensure a fair process.  Faced with a request to enjoin Farley from selling the shares at issue, the Court of Chancery held that it was reasonably probable that Farley could not cause the Company to validly issue stock, because he was the only remaining director of a three-person board.  The Court also held it was reasonably probable that Farley will be unable to meet his burden at trial of proving the share issuances were entirely fair.  Accordingly, the Court enjoined Farley from trading the shares pending a final adjudication of their validity.  This decision also provides helpful analysis, as did prior decisions in this matter, regarding how the Court will determine the amount of bond when granting preliminary injunctive relief.

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Court Rejects Use of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Preserve LLC Members’ Exit Sale Rights

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in all contracts governed by Delaware law. In some circumstances, the implied covenant may apply to fill “gaps” in an agreement consistent with the parties’ reasonable expectations at the time of contracting. Delaware courts have held, however, that implying terms in this manner should be a cautious enterprise.

The Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision in Oxbow Carbon & Minerals Holdings v. Crestview-Oxbow Acquisition, __ A.3d __, 2019 WL 237360 (Del. Jan. 17, 2019) emphasizes that implying terms as a “gap filler” is “a limited and extraordinary remedy” that does not protect sophisticated parties from the harsh operation of contract provisions in circumstances the parties could have anticipated. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that minority members of a limited liability company had no recourse to the implied covenant when the admission of new members reset certain capital return requirements that had to be satisfied before the minority members had the right to liquidate their investments through a sale of the company. The Supreme Court did so notwithstanding the Delaware Court of Chancery’s finding that, had the issue been identified and addressed at the time the new members were admitted, the minority members would not have agreed to that result. More ›

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Temporary Stopgaps Extend Federal Court Operations Through January 31st

The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts estimates that federal court operations will remain funded through Jan. 31, 2019. The extension has been achieved by deferring non-critical operating costs and the usage of court filing fees and other available funds.

Court System Notices

• US Courts: Judiciary Has Funds to Operate Through Jan. 31
• DE District Court: Notice Regarding Court Operations During Lapse in Appropriations
• DE Bankruptcy Court: Notice Regarding Court Operations During Lapse in Appropriations

Litigation and filings will continue in Delaware during the federal government shutdown. If you have questions, please contact our Director of Client Relations Dawn Sheiker (302.888.6804; dsheiker@morrisjames.com).

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Chancery Addresses Books and Records Demand Under Section 220 by Papa John’s Founder

Schnatter v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0542-AGB (Del. Ch. Jan. 15, 2019). 

As a general matter, under Section 220 of the DGCL, directors of a Delaware corporation enjoy the right to virtually unfettered access to the corporation’s books and records so they can exercise their fiduciary duties.  In this recent post-trial decision, the Court of Chancery addressed a request by Papa John’s founder and longtime spokesperson, John Schnatter, to inspect documents and communications leading up to the formation of a special committee that decided to terminate certain relationships with him following remarks construed as racial in nature.  While the parties resolved most of their disputes consensually, the remaining issues turned largely upon the Court’s factual finding that Schnatter sincerely wished to investigate potential mismanagement in connection with the committee’s decision to distance the company from him.  Particularly noteworthy, after considering recent precedents in this area, the Court ordered the production of communications relating to this issue that may be found in the other directors’ personal email accounts or on personal devices.  Also notable, in light of all the circumstances, the Court declined to find a separate action for breach of fiduciary duty filed by Schnatter in his capacity as a stockholder was a basis for denying inspection in his capacity as a director.

 

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Chancery Declines to Dismiss Claim that Acquirer Failed to Use “Commercially Reasonable Efforts” to Reach Earn-out Milestones

Himawan v. Cephalon, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-075-SG (Del. Ch. Dec. 28, 2018). 

Parties in M&A transactions commonly include efforts clauses, like the obligation to use best efforts, commercially reasonable efforts, etc., to some end.  Delaware law enforces such covenants and views them as creating affirmative duties.  Exactly what duties an efforts clause creates is contextual, however, and courts sometimes wrestle with how to apply them.  Parties on occasion try to bring clarity to their contract by defining what they intend their particular efforts clause to mean, like the parties attempted in this case. More ›

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Court of Chancery Addresses the Scope of Summary Control Disputes and Effectiveness of Written Consents

Brown v. Kellar, C.A. No. 2018-0687-MTZ (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2018)

Control disputes, like those under Section 225 of the DGCL, are summary, narrow proceedings limited to the issues regarding title to office.  The Court of Chancery will not hear or decide “collateral” matters.  Whether something is collateral turns on whether it is necessary to decide it to resolve the claim to office.  That, in turn, depends on the particular facts and claims of the case.  All this is due to the jurisdictional limitations of statutory control disputes as well as the policy of securing prompt resolutions.  In this summary judgment ruling, the Court declines to deem certain defenses collateral that related to the validity of a stockholder consent under equitable principles.  The ruling also addresses when a consent is treated as technically effective under Delaware law, i.e., usually upon delivery.

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Court of Chancery Invalidates Federal Court Forum-Selection Provision for Securities Cases

Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, C.A. No. 2017-0031-JTL (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018)

Delaware law permits a Delaware corporation to include a forum-selection provision in its certificate of incorporation governing all “internal affairs” claims by its stockholders.  There is much national debate on the topic of forum-selection provisions in charters governing securities claims, such as whether a corporation can require arbitration.  This decision wades into that debate by addressing a charter provision mandating a federal forum for securities claims.  In it, the Court of Chancery holds that the Delaware General Corporation Law (the DGCL) does not authorize a Delaware corporation to include a forum-selection provision in its charter governing claims under the 1933 Act.  The Court reasons that claims under the Act are external to the corporation—they do not “turn on the rights, powers, or preferences of the shares, language in the corporation’s charter or bylaws, a provision in the DGCL, or the equitable relationships that flow from the internal structure of the corporation.”  Because the claim exists outside of the contract between the corporation and its stockholders and does not relate to the corporation’s internal affairs, it is beyond the power of state corporate law to regulate.

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Court of Chancery Declines to Expand Dual-Natured Direct and Derivative Claims Under Gentile

Klein v. H.I.G. Capital LLC, C.A. No. 2017-0862-AGB (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018)

Under the Delaware Supreme Court’s Gentile decision, a claim may be dual-natured, meaning partially derivative on behalf of the corporation and partially direct on behalf of the stockholder.  One allure for plaintiffs of successfully pleading a dual-natured claim is avoiding the pre-suit demand-on-the-board requirements for purely derivative claims.  So it is not uncommon for plaintiffs to try to plead and argue into Gentile.  But Gentile has been limited to claims involving deals with a controlling stockholder that unfairly dilute the other stockholders of both economic and voting rights.  The Delaware Supreme Court recently clarified that in its El Paso decision.  And Delaware courts have been cautious in applying Gentile of late. More ›

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Court of Chancery Addresses Fiduciary Insider Trading Claims Under Brophy in Fitbit Litigation

In re Fitbit Inc. Stockholder Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 2017-0402-JRS (Del. Ch. Dec. 14, 2018)

Delaware law recognizes a claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on insider trading under the Brophy decision.  This is an important opinion because it recognizes an extension of potential liability under Brophy for trades made, not by the insider himself, but by an entity he or she controls.  It is a natural extension that furthers the important policy of preventing insiders from profiting based on non-public information.  The opinion also addresses demand futility principles under Braddock.  That decision deals with how to conduct a demand futility analysis on an amended complaint after changes in the board’s composition.

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Court of Chancery Addresses Overlapping Appraisal and Fiduciary Duty Action

In re Xura Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 12608-VCS (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 2018)

Lately, the Delaware Supreme Court has given great weight to the deal price in appraisal cases.  As a result, plaintiffs have put a greater focus on showing that the process leading to the merger makes that price unreliable, potentially because of breaches of fiduciary duty.  One strategy for recovery is to file a breach of fiduciary case after obtaining valuable discovery in the appraisal case.  This decision explains when such a fiduciary duty case can go forward notwithstanding the appraisal proceeding seeking to recover for the same loss.  More ›

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Court of Chancery Addresses Attorney Conduct and Sanctions

Lendus, LLC v. Goede, C.A. No. 2018-0233-SG (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 2018)

The Court of Chancery respects zealous advocacy, but demands professionalism and degrees of civility, among counsel and the parties.  Every few years a non-Delaware attorney admitted pro hac vice goes too far in aggressively representing his or her client in a Delaware litigation.  This decision discusses boundaries that should not be crossed, especially in a deposition.  Name calling, sarcasm, aggressive behavior, and other forms of bullying are not permitted and may result in the loss of the right to practice before the Court.

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Court of Chancery Explains Conspiracy Jurisdiction and Inquiry Notice Rules

iBio v. Fraunhoffer Gesellschaft, C.A. No. 2017-0790-TMR (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 2018)

This decision has two helpful analyses.  First, it addresses the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction under the well-known Instituto Bancario decision, which permits a Delaware court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant based on the Delaware acts of its co-conspirators.  Notably, the plaintiff in this case was a Delaware entity with its principal place of business in the State, providing a jurisdictional hook for that theory.  Second, it explains when a plaintiff is on inquiry notice so as to end any tolling period and start the statute of limitations clock.

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