Delaware Business Litigation Report

Delaware Supreme Court Affirms that Seller’s Change of Business Operations in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic Excused Buyer’s Obligation to Close

AB Stable VIII LLC v. Maps Hotels and Resorts One LLC, No. 71-2021 (Del. Dec. 8, 2021)
This Supreme Court decision affirms the Court of Chancery’s decision below (reported here) that a buyer’s obligation to purchase a $5.8 billion group of hotel properties was excused due to the seller’s failure to comply with a covenant that, between signing and closing, it would operate “only in the ordinary course of business, consistent with past practice in all material respects.”  More ›

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Chancery Strictly Applies Statutory Standing Requirement to Dismiss Books and Records Action by Former Stockholder Who Filed Hours After Effective Time of Merger

(Previously published in ABA's Business Law Today) 
Swift v. Houston Wire & Cable Co., C.A. No. 2021-0525-LWW (Del. Ch. Dec. 3, 2021)
In this decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery applied Section 220(c) of the Delaware General Corporation Law to dismiss a books and records complaint filed shortly after an event that, under the terms of a merger agreement, caused the plaintiff’s shares to be canceled.  More ›

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Chancery Holds that Corporation Cannot Rely on Its Stock Ledger to Deny A Stockholder Inspection Rights When it is Aware of and Concedes the Stockholder’s Status

Knott Partners L.P. v. Telepathy Labs, Inc., C.A. No. 2021-0583-SG (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2021)
To seek corporate records under section 220 of the DGCL, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it is a stockholder. Generally, a corporation can rely on its stock ledger to determine who is a stockholder of record. This case confirmed, however, that a corporation may not rely on its stock ledger to deprive a stockholder of inspection rights when the corporation was aware of the stockholder’s status but failed to update its stock ledger to reflect that. More ›

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Chancery Sustains Claims for Controlling Stockholders’ Breach of Fiduciary Duties, But Dismisses Claim to Void Transaction under DGCL Section 205

Amgine Techs. (US), Inc. v. Miller, C.A. No. 2020-0537-JRS (Del. Ch. Nov. 29, 2021)
This case involves the Court of Chancery’s consideration of various Rule 12 arguments for dismissal advanced by defendants – alleged controlling stockholders who assigned certain of the corporation’s intellectual property to another entity they owned, and who allegedly caused the corporation to enter into a stockholders’ agreement that gave them preferential terms. More ›

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Chancery Dismisses Derivative Action Based On Alleged Liability Under DGCL § 174 For Stock Repurchases and Dividends

In re The Chemours Co. Deriv. Litig., C.A. 2020-0786-SG (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2021)
Broadly speaking, Sections 160 and 173 of the DGCL prohibit a corporation from repurchasing stock or issuing dividends if doing so would exceed the corporation’s surplus. Both Sections 160 and 173 are enforceable under Section 174, which provides that directors “under whose administration” a “willful or negligent” violation of Section 160 or 173 occurs are “jointly and severally liable” to the corporation. Here, the Court of Chancery rejected a challenge to dividend and stock repurchases premised upon directors’ alleged incorrect assessment of potential environmental liabilities.  More ›

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Chancery Awards $9.5 Million Mootness Fee for Reduction of Voting Control and Other Benefits

Hollywood Firefighters Pension Fund v. Malone, C.A. 220-0880-SG (Nov. 8, 2021)
A plaintiff may be entitled to a mootness fee if it shows that its action had merit and produced a corporate benefit. This case outlines the Court of Chancery’s analysis in valuing non-monetary benefits and, in turn, the appropriate mootness fee. More ›

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Chancery Rules that Multiple Egregious Discovery Abuses Lead to the Ultimate Sanction

DG BF, LLC v. Ray, C.A. No. 2020-0459-MTZ (Del. Ch. Nov. 19, 2021)
Delaware courts may impose sanctions on parties that refuse to comply with court orders or neglect their own discovery obligations. Possible sanctions may include, among other things, monetary penalties, an instruction of adverse inference, or the ultimate sanction of default judgment against the offending party. These sanctions are imposed to remedy the wrongs at-issue and to deter abusive discovery conduct. More ›

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Chancery Finds Former Directors Bringing Wrongful Termination Claims Were Not Entitled to all Privileged Communications During Their Board Tenures, and Shifts Some Fees for Inadequate Privilege Logs

SerVaas v. Ford Smart Mobility LLC, C.A. No. 2020-0909-LWW (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2021)
With limited exceptions, directors normally have “unfettered” access to corporate information. This decision indicates, however, that the same may not hold true for former directors who do not challenge their removal as directors and who seek documents for reasons unrelated to their prior board service. Here, the Court of Chancery denied a motion to compel by two former directors who challenged the termination of their employment, and who sought in discovery all of the documents the corporation withheld as a privilege from their time as directors.  More ›

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Chancery Finds General Partner Breached Partnership Agreement in Exercising Call Right, and Awards Limited Partners Nearly $700 Million in Damages

Bandera Master Fund LP v. Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP, C.A. No. 2018-0372-JTL (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2021)
If a partnership agreement requires an opinion of counsel as a condition precedent, such opinion must be rendered in subjective good faith under Delaware law, As Boardwalk Pipeline Partners illustrates, a court applying Delaware law may reject such an opinion as rendered in bad faith if the counsel and the requesting party involved coordinate to develop counterfactual assumptions designed to generate a desired result for the requesting party. More ›

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Chancery Dismisses Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims Involving Bio-Tech Company Developing a COVID-19 Vaccine

In re Vaxart, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, Consol. C.A. No. 2020-0767-PAF (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2021)
Plaintiffs challenged amendments to warrant agreements between Vaxart and its former controlling stockholder, Armistice, alleging that the board intentionally withheld information significantly affecting the company’s share price, which permitted Armistice to engage in insider trading in violation of the board’s and Armistice’s fiduciary duties. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for failure to make demand on the board. The Court granted the motion in part and dismissed derivative claims against Armistice and the board, finding that plaintiffs had failed to establish that Armistice was a controller and (relatedly) that demand on the Vaxart board would be futile.  More ›

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Chancery Denies Books and Records Inspection Brought to Advance the Stockholder’s Interests as a Creditor

Georgia Notes 18, LLC v. Net Element, Inc., C.A. No. 2021-0246-JRS (Del. Ch. Nov. 18, 2021)
Plaintiff, a stockholder and creditor of the defendant company, demanded to inspect the company’s books and records pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 220. The company objected, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to state a proper purpose for inspection and had a primary improper purpose. The Court found in the company’s favor, determining that plaintiff sought documents for the primary improper purpose of seeking pre-litigation discovery in connection to its interests as a creditor. More ›

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Chancery Dismisses Derivative Suit Involving Wayfair and Challenging Debt Issuance to Private Equity Shareholders for Failure to Make Demand

Equity-League Pension Trust Fund v. Great Hill Partners, L.P., C.A. No. 2020-0992-SG (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2021)
A derivative suit brought on behalf of online home goods retailer, Wayfair, challenged the issuance of $535 million in convertible debt early in the COVID-19 pandemic to certain of Wayfair’s private equity investors and their affiliates. The transaction was recommended by a transaction committee and an audit committee, and was ultimately approved by the Wayfair board. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 23.1 arguing that the plaintiff was required but failed to make a pre-suit demand on the Wayfair board. Plaintiff argued that demand was futile because, in addition to the four directors who were on the buy-side of the transaction and thus interested, three directors sitting on the audit committee faced a substantial likelihood of liability. Plaintiff needed to sufficiently allege that at least one of the audit committee members was conflicted to arrive at a majority of the board for demand futility purposes. Finding that plaintiff had failed to adequately plead demand futility, the Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. More ›

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Chancery Applies Traditional Fiduciary Principles to a SPAC in First Test of the Popular Vehicle for Private Companies to Access Public Markets under Delaware Corporate Law

A Special Purpose Acquisition Company or SPAC is a popular investment vehicle to take private companies public. A SPAC, commonly referred to as a blank check company, is a company whose stock is traded on a public market, but has no operations. Typically, the SPAC raises capital through an IPO with the singular goal of entering into a business combination with a private operating company (referred to as a de-SPAC merger), taking the private company public and giving the new public company its stock listing. A SPAC is often formed and controlled by a sponsor, whose primary job is to identify a target private operating company for the de-SPAC merger. A common feature of a SPAC is that the sponsor receives founder shares in the SPAC for a nominal capital contribution, which shares convert to substantial common shares in the new public company if a business combination with a private company is consummated within the market-standard, two-year period from the IPO. However, if no such transaction is completed within two years, the IPO proceeds are returned with interest to the public stockholders, and the SPAC winds up and liquidates, which renders worthless the sponsor’s founder shares. While these features and structure are common in SPACs, and the attendant mismatched financial incentives between the sponsor and the public stockholders in a de-SPAC merger are known to SPAC investors, this does not remedy the conflicts of interest inherent in the SPAC structure. Moreover, that a de-SPAC merger may legally comply with the DGCL does not shield the merger from application of well-established equitable fiduciary principles of Delaware corporate law. More ›

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Chancery Dismisses Time-Barred Complaint Against Zillow

Chertok v. Zillow, Inc., C.A. No. 2019-0849-LWW (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2021)
Plaintiffs, a former co-founder and director of NMD Interactive (“Chertok”) and an LLC that he managed, brought a breach of contract action against Zillow seeking merger consideration and dividends in connection with Zillow’s 2013 acquisition of NMD. Over the course of six years, Zillow and plaintiffs engaged in negotiations relating to payment of consideration and dividends that Zillow continued to withhold based on plaintiffs’ alleged failure to comply with conditions in the merger agreement. Relevant to the analysis in this case, starting in 2011, NMD brought litigation unrelated to the merger against Chertok in New York federal court, which concluded in 2017. More ›

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Chancery Rules That The Standard Of Proof For Contempt Motions Is The Preponderance Of The Evidence, Not Clear And Convincing Evidence

inTEAM Associates, LLC v. Heartland Payment Systems, LLC, C.A. No. 11523-VCF (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2021)
Court of Chancery Rule 70(b) empowers the Court to hold a party in contempt for, among other things, failing to obey an injunctive order. The standard of proof required to obtain a contempt order has not been uniformly applied. This recent decision applies the preponderance of the evidence standard, in contrast to certain decisions over the past decade applying the clear and convincing evidence standard. More ›

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