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Summaries and analysis of recent Delaware court decisions concerning business-related litigation.
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- February 19, 2021
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Showing 396 posts in Chancery.
Chancery Awards Attorneys’ Fees for Monetary and Therapeutic Benefits from Goldman Sachs Director Compensation Settlement and Considers Objector’s Fee Request
Stein v. Blankfein, C.A. No. 2017-0354-SG (Del. Ch. Jul. 12, 2021)
This decision concerns fee applications under the “corporate benefit” doctrine for benefits achieved in derivative litigation. More ›
Chancery Explains Pleading Standard and Sustains Unjust Enrichment Claim Related to Plaintiff’s Forfeiture of LLC Acquisition Rights
Angel v. Warrior Met Coal, Inc., C.A. No. 2019-0235-SG (Del. Ch. Jun. 30, 2021)
Under Delaware’s notice pleading standard, a plaintiff’s claim will survive a motion to dismiss if it is “reasonably conceivable” that the plaintiff might prevail. The Court here explained that test is whether a “claim’s success seems possible to a rational objective observer.” Notwithstanding this plaintiff-friendly standard, Delaware courts will dismiss a claim if a plaintiff fails to plead all necessary elements. More ›
Chancery Finds Breach of Fiduciary Duty Where Defendant Resorted to Extra-Contractual Self-Help
Macrophage Therapeutics, Inc. v. Goldberg, C.A. No. 2019-0137-JRS (Del. Ch. Jun. 23, 2021) (Post-trial Memorandum Opinion)
Macrophage Therapeutics, Inc. v. Goldberg, C.A. No. 2019-0137-JRS (Del. Ch. Jun. 23, 2021) (Letter Opinion)
Delaware law provides several remedies for a party who believes that a contractual breach has occurred. But extra-contractual self-help is usually not one. As this case demonstrates, the choice to seek direct retribution, rather than legal recourse, may constitute a breach of a director’s duty of loyalty. A related decision also considered and rejected the argument that formal board authorization was needed for a corporation to commence litigation. More ›
Section 225 Action Filed Eight Months After Removal Barred by Laches
Simple Global, Inc. v. Banasik, C.A. No. 2018-0809-PAF (Del. Ch. June 24, 2021)
Under Delaware law, a director or officer who disputes her removal as such may be subject to equitable defenses if she does not proceed promptly to contest it. Here, plaintiff Simple Global was owned by three stockholders, one of which, defendant Banasik, was removed as a director and officer by the others in June 2018. In November 2018, Simple Global sued Banasik for breach of fiduciary duty, to which Banasik responded in April 2019 by, among other things, filing a counterclaim under Section 225 of the DGCL asserting he was not properly removed as a director. More ›
Chancery Addresses Claims Arising Out of LLC Dispute Involving Parallel Venture
Largo Legacy Group, LLC v. Evens Charles, C.A. No. 2020-0105-MTZ (Del. Ch. June 30, 2021)
In this LLC dispute, an investor in a hotel development company alleged that the company principals breached the operating agreement and their fiduciary duties by implementing a fraudulent scheme whereby a parallel venture, that they owned and controlled, was provided with certain adjacent land and company funds in a manner that improperly advantaged the parallel venture and the principals while harming the plaintiff. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants had breached their fiduciary and contractual duties by refusing to provide it with financial information that it was entitled to under the operating agreement. The defendants moved to dismiss. The Court of Chancery, finding, as an initial matter, that laches did not block the claims, held that while plaintiff had failed to plead its fraud claim with adequate particularity, it had properly pled both its breach of fiduciary duty claim in connection with the alleged scheme and its breach of contract claim in connection with the company’s refusal to provide certain financial information. In addition to dismissing the fraud claim, the Court also dismissed plaintiff’s duplicative breach of fiduciary duty claim relating to the withheld financial information. More ›
Chancery Dismisses Conclusory Allegations of Gross Negligence and Disloyalty Against Oracle Officers and Directors Related to Alleged Controlled, Self-Dealing NetSuite Acquisition
In re Oracle Corp. Derv. Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0337-SG (Del. Ch. June 21, 2021)
While Delaware maintains a notice pleading standard, this decision reflects that conclusory allegations of breach of fiduciary duty leveled against officers and directors of a Delaware corporation may be found insufficient to state a claim. More ›
Chancery Holds That Claim Based on Purposeful Tanking of Merger Agreement Earnout Is Breach of Contract Claim
Shareholder Representative Services LLC v. Albertson’s Companies, C.A. No. 2020-0710-JRS (Del. Ch. June 7, 2021)
Many merger agreements include earnout provisions under which the stockholders in the acquired company are entitled to additional consideration upon the occurrence of certain financial milestones. In this case, the Court of Chancery analyzed and considered the appropriate way to plead claims that the acquirer purposefully operated the company to miss earnout milestones. More ›
Chancery Finds that Deal-Price-Less-Synergies was Best Indicator of Fair Value in Statutory Appraisal of Public Company
In re Appraisal of Regal Entertainment Grp., C.A. No. 2018-0266-JTL (Del. Ch. May 13, 2021)
Recent Delaware appraisal cases have found that reliable market indicators present the best evidence of a corporation’s “fair value.” Where the deal price itself provides the best evidence, the Court will deduct from the deal price any synergies paid to the sellers. Changes in value between signing and the closing date of the merger may also be taken into account. This decision applies these principles in determining the “fair value” payable to certain stockholders of Regal Entertainment Group, a public company, following its 2018 sale to Cineworld Group, a strategic acquirer, for $23 per share. More ›
Clean-Up Doctrine to Adjudicate Legal Claims in Chancery May Take Precedence Over Request for Jury Trial
Firststring Research, Inc. v. JSS Medical Research Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0332-KSJM (Del. Ch. May 28, 2021)
Delaware has not merged its courts of law and equity, which may have implications for a litigant seeking a jury trial. When a counterclaim-plaintiff seeks a jury trial for a claim otherwise within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, application of the clean-up doctrine might justify retaining the counterclaims in Chancery and forgoing jury-trial rights. More ›
Chancery Reasons That Board’s Decision To Address Alleged “Red Flags” Related To Pending Litigation, After Litigation Is Resolved, Is Not Bad Faith For Caremark Purposes
Pettry v. Smith et al., C.A. No. 2019-0796-JRS (Del. Ch. June 28, 2021)
As discussed in Caremark and its progeny, fiduciary duties require directors to monitor the business and affairs of a corporation. Here, the Court of Chancery addressed the issue of oversight liability in the context of a Board’s decision, despite “red flags,” to delay certain additional remedial actions pending resolution of directly related litigation. More ›
Chancery Rejects Plaintiff’s Attempt to Recharacterize Pre-Suit Demands
The Raj & Sonal Abhyanker Fam. Tr. v. Blake, C.A. No. 2020-0521-KSJM (June 17, 2021)
Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 presents a would-be derivative plaintiff with two exclusive options: make a pre-suit demand on the board to bring the claims at issue, or bring the claims and plead demand futility. A stockholder who elects to make a demand on the board may challenge whether the board wrongly refused the demand, but the stockholder cannot later bring suit and allege demand futility. And, as this case shows, the Court of Chancery will scrutinize a stockholder’s attempt to circumvent this restriction. More ›
Chancery Dismisses Simultaneously-Filed Delaware Action in Favor of New Jersey Action
Sweeney v. RPD Holdgs. Grp., LLC, C.A. No. 2020-0813-SG (Del. Ch. May 27, 2021)
Delaware’s forum non conveniens jurisprudence typically turns on when parties file competing actions. Under Cryo-Maid’s “overwhelming hardship” standard, a defendant seeking to stay a first-filed Delaware action in favor of litigation elsewhere must show that the six so-called Cryo-Maid factors tip overwhelmingly in the defendant’s favor. By contrast, under McWane’s less onerous discretionary standard, a defendant seeking to stay a later-filed Delaware action often succeeds if the defendant can point to foreign litigation between the same parties in a forum that can do prompt and complete justice. More ›
Chancery Upholds Fiduciary Duty Claims Arising Out Of Deal Involving an Alleged Control Group That Included Non-Stockholders and a Sale Process Managed By a Disinterested and Independent Special Committee
In re Pattern Energy Grp. Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 2020-0357-MTZ (Del. Ch. May 6, 2021)
This decision mostly denying a motion to dismiss examines several important issues in post-closing M&A fiduciary duty litigation relevant to stating a claim and overcoming an otherwise claim-cleansing stockholder vote under the Corwin doctrine. These include what it takes to adequately plead the existence of a control group, a fraud-on-the-board theory, a bad faith breach of fiduciary duty by admittedly disinterested and independent directors charged with managing a sale process and overseeing potential conflicts, and claims against individual officers. Core to the plaintiff’s well-pled complaint in this action were allegations that the committee and certain officers favored a buyer preferred by a private equity fund, which, among other things, formed the company, controlled its upstream supplier, and held significant contractual consent rights. More ›
Chancery Finds No Transaction-Specific Control Where Plaintiffs Failed to Allege that a Majority of the Members of a Special Committee Were Under the Sway of a Would-Be Controller
In re GGP Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 2018-0267-JRS (Del. Ch. May 25, 2021).
Under MFW and its progeny, if there is a conflicted controlling stockholder, then in order to receive the benefits of the business judgment rule, the transaction must be negotiated and approved by independent and disinterested directors and conditioned on an informed and uncoerced vote of a majority of the minority stockholders. A stockholder that owns less than 50% of the voting power of the corporation may be a controller if it exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation either generally or with respect to the transaction at-issue. More ›
Chancery Clarifies When Related Agreements Will Be Construed Together
Murphy Marine Services of Delaware, Inc. v. GT USA Wilmington, LLC (Del. Ch. May 28, 2021)
When interpreting a contract, Delaware courts generally stick to the four corners of the agreement at issue. One exception is when a contract is part of a set of inseparable agreements. In that situation, courts may construe all the agreements together as a whole. But, as seen here, the exception may not apply if the contract at issue independently effectuates the parties’ intent and does not expressly incorporate the other. More ›
