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Summaries and analysis of recent Delaware court decisions concerning business-related litigation.
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Showing 546 posts by Albert J. Carroll.
Chancery Denies Member Status to Individual Not Admitted By Members in Accordance With LLC Agreement
Riverside Risk Advisors LLC v. Chao, C.A. No. 2019-0789-KSJM (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2022)
The LLC Act generally provides that someone is admitted as an LLC member as provided in the LLC agreement. Here, the plaintiff sued seeking declaratory relief that the defendant, a former employee, was not a member of the LLC and that a 2015 agreement was the LLC’s governing document, rather than an earlier agreement. The Court of Chancery ruled in the plaintiff’s favor, finding that the defendant was not a member because, under the LLC agreement, written consent of all members was required for admission, and the defendant needed to agree to be bound by the agreement in writing. But neither of these steps occurred. The Court also held that the 2015 agreement was the current operative agreement for the LLC despite not being approved by the defendant, because, as required by the previous LLC agreement, it was approved by all members, which the defendant was not.
Chancery Applies Implied Consent to Service Provision of Delaware LLC Act to Individual Without Any Formal Role at the LLC
In Re P3 Health Grp. Hldgs., LLC, Consol. C.A. No. 2021-0518-JTL (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2022)
The implied consent provision of Section 18-109 of Delaware’s LLC Act provides that “managers” of Delaware LLCs consent to the service of process in Delaware. The statute defines “managers” as both (1) those formally designated as managers, and (2) those who “participate [] materially” in management. Disputes over whether an individual not falling in the first category falls in the second often focus on individuals with some formal role at the LLC. As this decision illustrates, however, an individual without any formal role at the LLC, but who otherwise participates materially in the LLC’s management, may also be found to be a manager, and thus have consented to service and jurisdiction in Delaware. Facts relevant to the Court of Chancery’s finding of an adequately alleged acting management, in this case, included the defendant’s direction of the company’s managers, control of the company’s advisors, involvement in legal decisions, and access to information.
Equitable Fraud Claim Sufficient to Support Court of Chancery Jurisdiction
Trust Robin, Inc. v. Tissue Analytics, Inc., C.A. No. 2021-0806-SG (Del. Ch. Sep. 29, 2022)
After initially questioning its own subject matter jurisdiction in a dispute involving allegations of breach of contract and tort in connection with a services agreement, the Court of Chancery concluded that the plaintiff’s equitable fraud claim was not “simply a makeweight equitable hook” attached to its legal claims. The plaintiff sufficiently alleged a special relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, and it was possible that the plaintiff could recover for equitable, but not legal, fraud. The Court’s reasoning cited the alignment of the parties’ interests, the defendant’s control over the parties’ joint purpose by virtue of controlling certain intellectual property and other proprietary information belonging to the plaintiff, and the defendant’s alleged use of that control to engage in self-dealing. Therefore, the Court permitted the matter to proceed.
Chancery Finds Personal Jurisdiction Over Individual Who Formed Delaware Entities in Connection with a Challenged Merger Transaction
In Re P3 Health Grp. Hldgs., LLC, Consol. C.A. No. 2021-0518-JTL (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2022)
The Court of Chancery rejected an individual defendant’s challenge to Delaware’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over him. Although the defendant portrayed himself as merely a shareholder of Delaware entities (which is not in itself a basis for personal jurisdiction), the Court found that he had transacted business in the state for purposes of Delaware’s Long Arm Statute because he also formed two entities as part of a planned merger. It did not offend due process to require the individual to defend litigation related to the merger in Delaware because there was a nexus between his contacts and the claims and because he should have reasonably anticipated that Delaware would exercise jurisdiction over him in litigation arising from the merger.
Chancery Holds Defendant in Civil Contempt for Using Discovery Materials for Business Purpose in Violation of Confidentiality Order
Murphy Marine Services of Delaware, Inc. v. GT USA Wilmington, LLC, C.A. No. 2018-0664-LWW (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2022)
During the course of a two-part trial in which plaintiffs argued that the defendant breached the terms of a binding letter agreement, plaintiffs brought a motion for contempt against the defendant alleging that defendant used discovery materials produced by plaintiffs in connection with the litigation in negotiations with one of the largest customers of plaintiff Murphy Marine Services. In connection with the underlying action, plaintiffs produced documents to the defendant reflecting the revenue and financial information of Murphy Marine Services’ customers. Defendant admitted that estimates used in negotiating with one of Murphy Marine Services’ customers were determined using information obtained from those discovery materials. The confidentiality order entered by the Court in connection with the litigation contained common language providing that discovery materials would be used solely for purposes of the litigation. Thus, plaintiffs contended that using the discovery materials to gain a competitive edge in negotiating with one of Murphy Marine Services’ customers was a clear violation of the confidentiality order’s terms. The Court agreed with the plaintiffs. In addition to finding that defendant breached and repudiated the binding letter agreement, the Court therefore also found that defendant’s use of discovery materials for a business purpose violated the confidentiality order and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiffs’ fees and expenses incurred in bringing the motion for contempt.
Board Lacks Standing to Bring Motion to Dismiss Because It Delegated That Authority to Special Litigation Committee
Rowan v. Infinity Q Capital Mgmt., LLC, C.A. No. 2022-0176-MTZ (Del. Ch. Sep. 12, 2022)
If a conflicted board delegates all authority over derivative claims to a special litigation committee (“SLC”), then the board may lack authority separately to assert procedural defenses, including a motion to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1. But whether a board has given up this authority depends upon the sequence and terms of the SLC’s creation. More ›
Chancery Addresses Multiple Discovery Scuffles in Twitter and Musk Litigation
Twitter Inc. v. Elon musk et al., C.A, No. 2022-0613-KSJM (Del Ch. Aug. 23, 2022)
Twitter Inc. v. Elon musk et al., C.A, No. 2022-0613-KSJM (Del Ch. Aug. 25, 2022) Letter Decision Resolving Plantiffs' Second Discovery Motion
Twitter Inc. v. Elon musk et al., C.A, No. 2022-0613-KSJM (Del Ch. Aug. 25, 2022) Letter Decision Resolving Defendants' Second Discovery Motion
Twitter Inc. v. Elon musk et al., C.A, No. 2022-0613-KSJM (Del Ch. Aug. 25, 2022) Letter Decision Resolving Defendants' Third Discovery Motion
Twitter Inc. v. Elon musk et al., C.A, No. 2022-0613-KSJM (Del Ch. Sept. 7, 2022) Letter Decision Denying Defendants' Motion for Reargument
Twitter Inc. v. Elon musk et al., C.A, No. 2022-0613-KSJM (Del Ch. Sept. 7, 2022) Letter Decision Resolving Defendants' Motion For Leave To Amend And Extend Case Schedule
Twitter Inc. v. Elon Musk et al., C.A. No. 2022-0613-KSJM (Del Ch. Sept 7. 2022) Letter Resolving Fourth Discovery Motion
Twitter Inc. v. Elon Musk et al., C.A. No. 2022-0613-KSJM (Del Ch. Sept 7. 2022) Letter Decision Resolving Defendants Fourth Discovery
During its pendency, the suit by Twitter to compel Musk to complete his $44 billion purchase of the company produced several discovery rulings illustrating the Court of Chancery’s rules and practice. More ›
Chancery Denies Preliminary Injunction For Overly Broad Restrictive Covenants
Kodiak Building Partners LLC v. Adams, C.A. No. 2022-0311-MTZ (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2022)
Delaware courts review noncompete and nonsolicitation agreements to ensure that they “(1) are reasonable in geographic scope and temporal duration, (2) advance a legitimate economic interest of the party seeking its enforcement, and (3) survive a balancing of the equities.” And Delaware law recognizes that an acquirer has a legitimate economic interest in protecting what it purchases, including the purchased company’s assets goodwill. Here, the plaintiff argued that it not only had a legitimate business interest in protecting the goodwill of the company it purchased, but also had a legitimate business interest in protecting its other businesses, including those that pre-dated the acquisition, and, as a result, could restrict a former employee from participating in industries relating to any of those businesses. The Court of Chancery disagreed, finding that the plaintiff’s legitimate economic interest did not extend to goodwill and competitive spaces acquired in other transactions with other companies in different industries. The Court also found that the scope of the noncompete and nonsolicitation covenants at issue were unreasonable, ruling that the provisions’ geographical scope was unreasonably broad, as they covered areas surrounding the plaintiff’s subsidiaries, rather than only areas related to the acquired company. The Court, therefore, declined to enter a preliminary injunction, finding the plaintiff did have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that the employee’s promise not to challenge the reasonableness of his restrictive covenants within the relevant contract could not circumvent the Court’s mandate to review those covenants for reasonableness.
Chancery Determines Divorcee Was One Share Short of Equal Ownership Needed To Avoid Removal from Leadership of Business Empire
Haart v. Scaglia, C.A. No. 2022-0145-MTZ (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2022)
In public, a high-powered couple presented themselves as equal owners of an operating company, of which the wife was also the CEO and a director. After marrying, the husband transferred fifty percent of the common stock of an umbrella holding company to his wife. He also transferred to her one share shy of equal ownership of preferred stock—leaving her with 49.9995957 percent of the preferred shares. After she realized this imbalance, the wife continued to insist they were equal owners. As their marriage deteriorated, the husband used his one-share majority to remove her from leadership at the holding company and the operating company, of which the holding company was the sole member and managing member. She brought claims in the Court of Chancery, alleging equal ownership and a corporate deadlock, seeking judicial dissolution. More ›
Chancery Applies Implied Consent to Service Provision of Delaware LLC Act to LLC’s General Counsel and Chief Legal Officer
In re P3 Health Group Holdings, LLC, Consol. C.A. No. 2021-0518-JTL (Del. Ch. Sept. 12, 2022)
The plaintiff, a large unit holder in a Delaware LLC, sued several defendants, including the general counsel and chief legal officer of the LLC, for allegedly breaching her fiduciary duties to the LLC and its members for her role in facilitating a challenged de-SPAC merger. The implied consent provision of Section 18-109 of Delaware’s LLC Act provides that “managers” of Delaware LLCs consent to the service of process in Delaware. The statute defines “managers” as both (1) those formally designated as managers, and (2) those who “participate [] materially” in management. Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction arguing that Section 18-109 did not apply to her in her role as an officer of the LLC because (1) she was not a designated manager, and (2) she was not acting in a managerial capacity. Plaintiff argued that because the defendant voluntarily assumed the role of a senior officer of the LLC and because, as alleged in the complaint, she acted in a significant managerial capacity with respect to the LLC, the implied consent provision did, in fact, apply. The Court of Chancery agreed with the plaintiff and its decision provides a thorough discussion of the acting manager prong of Section 18-109. The Court reasoned that, at the pleading stage, the customary responsibilities of a general counsel and chief legal officer provided a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction. The specific allegations, in this case, supported a reasonable inference that the defendant acted in a significant managerial capacity in connection with the challenged conduct.
Chancery Concludes That Transaction Meets MFW Standard
In re Match Grp. Inc. Deriv. Lit., Cons. C.A. 2020-0505-MTZ (Del. Ch. Sep. 1, 2022)
Under the so-called MFW framework, a transaction with a controller is subject to business judgment review, rather than the more exacting entire fairness review, if the transaction satisfies all six procedural protections elaborated in Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). In simple terms, the MFW framework mimics the two key protections that exist in a transaction with a third party by requiring an independent negotiating agent (i.e., a board committee) and approval by the majority of the non-controlling stockholders. But the standard can be difficult to meet because the failure to comply with a single condition is fatal. Nonetheless, here, the Court of Chancery concluded that the transaction satisfied all six elements of the MFW framework because the as-pled facts established that the special committee had necessary authority, that a majority of the special committee was sufficiently independent, that the special committee satisfied its duty of care in negotiating a fair price, and that the minority stockholders approved the transaction through an uncoerced and informed vote. Because the plaintiff did not plead any claim that would overcome the application of the business judgment rule, the Court dismissed the case.
Chancery Relies on Inconsistencies Between Board Materials and Proxy Statement to Order Books and Records Production
Hightower v. Sharpspring, Inc., C.A. No. 2021-0720-KSJM (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2022)
Once a plaintiff establishes a proper purpose under Section 220 of the DGCL, the Court of Chancery must determine the scope of the books and records inspection, which is those documents that are essential and sufficient for the stockholder’s stated purpose. Often, where the inspection relates to possible mismanagement or wrongdoing at the corporation regarding a specific transaction, the production of formal board materials will be sufficient for the stockholder’s needs. Here, however, the Court found that a plaintiff exploring a transaction involving a conflict demonstrated a need for documents beyond formal board materials, relying on inconsistencies between the board minutes and the proxy statement for the merger, which could be reconciled only with additional information. The Court awarded the plaintiff access to both informal board materials as well as officer-level materials not shared with the board in several defined categories.
Implied Covenant of Good Faith Covers Contractual Conditions “Too Obvious” to State Expressly in Indemnification Dispute
Baldwin v. New Wood Resources, LLC, App. No. 303, 2021 (Del. Aug. 16, 2022)
This appeal involved an underlying claim that Baldwin had improperly refused to repay litigation expenses advanced to him under New Wood Resource’s limited liability company agreement. The agreement provided Baldwin with indemnification so long as he acted in good faith, and it also specified a process for determining whether Baldwin had done so. One narrow issue on appeal was whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing required the good faith determination itself to be conducted in good faith. Reversing the Superior Court, an en banc panel of the Supreme Court ruled that the implied covenant did apply. The Court relied upon its earlier decision in Dieckman v. Regency GP LP to restate the principle that one function of the implied covenant is to cover those contractual conditions that are "too obvious" to include expressly. That "too obvious" category included the condition that the good faith determination be made in good faith. Because New World Resources conceded this point at argument and did not make a persuasive alternative argument, the Court remanded the case.
Chancery Addresses eDiscovery Self-Collection in Pro Se Defense of Restrictive Covenant Dispute
Summit Fire & Security LLC v. Kolias, C.A. No. 2022-0460-MTZ (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2022)
“Self-collection” in eDiscovery refers to a party selecting its own data for review or production without input from counsel. Delaware courts generally disapprove of self-collection. But the courts will approach the issue differently in pro se matters where it may be necessary and appropriate for a party to self-collect, without turning any data repositories over to a vendor. In this restrictive covenant dispute, the plaintiff entity moved to compel the production of a complete forensic image of an individual pro se defendant’s phone, claiming that the prior production of relevant text messages was inadequate based on the defendant’s self-collection of data. The Court declined to order that relief, noting that self-collection often is necessary for pro se parties and that there was no indication that the defendant had failed to meet any of his preservation obligations. In light of those facts, and the case’s circumstances, requiring full access to a complete forensic image was unreasonable and disproportionate to the needs of the case.
Supreme Court Reverses Chancery Approval of Litigation Settlement for Overly Broad Release and Recommends Change to Chancery Rule 23.1
Griffith v. Stein, No. 264, 2021, C.A. No. 2017-0354 (Del. Aug. 16, 2022)
The Court of Chancery denied a non-monetary settlement for derivative claims that included allegations of excessive non-employee director compensation, siding with an objector, and awarding the objector fees. Subsequently, the parties agreed to a new settlement that included a financial benefit to the corporation. The objector then renewed his objection, arguing that the settlement improperly released future claims and that the plaintiff was not an adequate representative of the corporation’s interests. The plaintiff argued that future claims could be waived because the settlement included a compensation cap, that the released claims were covered by allegations of the complaint, and that the parties were only trying to import the Delaware standard of corporate waste into their release. The Court of Chancery approved the new settlement and did not award the objector additional attorneys’ fees. The objector appealed. More ›