Delaware Business Litigation Report

Delaware Court of Chancery Dismisses Caremark Claim Arising From Marriott Cybersecurity Breach

Previously published on Business Law Today

Fire Ret. Sys. of St. Louis v. Sorenson, et al., 2021 WL 4593777 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 2021).
The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed pursuant to Rule 23.1 derivative claims arising from the hack of roughly 500 million users’ personal data following Marriott’s 2016 acquisition of Starwood Hotels and Resorts – one of the largest hacks ever, an event that spawned lawsuits and governmental investigations. Among other things, the stockholder-plaintiff failed to allege with particularity facts showing that a majority of the board of directors consciously disregarded “red flags” showing alleged non-compliance data privacy norms. While “[w]ith hindsight knowledge of the extent of the data breach,” the board’s remediation plan was implemented “probably too slow.” Id. at *16. But, the court reasoned, “the difference between a flawed effort and a deliberate failure to act is one of extent and intent. A Caremark violation requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the latter.” Id. at *19. Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint.

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Delaware Court of Chancery Upholds Incumbent Directors’ Decision not to Excuse Stockholders’ Non-Compliance with Advance Notice Bylaw

Previously posted on Business Law Today

Rosenbaum v. CytoDyn Inc., 2021 WL 4775410 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2021)
The Delaware Court of Chancery recently upheld incumbents’ decision not to include insurgent director nominees on the ballot due to their failure to comply with an advance notice bylaw. For months, the director nominees and certain affiliated stockholders were aware of the requirements of the bylaw, which had been adopted on a clear day. On the eve of the deadline, they submitted a deficient notice that failed to disclose (i) the supporters of the nominees or their proposals, and (ii) the fact one nominee recently tried to have the corporation purchase his separate business, and that he may do so again. The court reasoned that, had the stockholders proceeded sooner, and submitted a deficient notice with “ample time” before the deadline, then directors exercising their fiduciary duties may have had to work with the dissidents to address the deficiencies. Id. at *17. As it stood, however, the incumbents’ decision to enforce the bylaw did not evince “manipulative conduct” in violation of the incumbents’ fiduciary duties. See id. at *14-17. 

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Chancery Denies Motion to Compel Director’s Privileged Communications Stored on Third-Party’s Email Server

In Re Dell Technologies Inc Class V Stockholders Litigation, Consol. C.A. No. 2018-0816-JTL (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2021) (TRANSCRIPT)
A director utilizing an email account associated with a different company for board service communications might unintentionally compromise otherwise privileged communications. Here, a member of Dell’s board of directors served on a special committee and utilized an email account associated with his former employer to communicate with the committee’s lawyers. Plaintiff moved to compel the production of otherwise privileged communications on his account, raising the question of whether the director had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his communications. More ›

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Delaware Supreme Court Overrules Gentile, Resolving Tension in Legal Test To Determine Whether a Claim Is Direct or Derivative

Brookfield Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Rosson, No. 406, 2020 (Del. Sept. 20, 2021)
Seeking to bring clarity to the issue of whether a claim is direct or derivative—a potentially outcome-determinative issue—the Delaware Supreme Court overturned its own precedent in Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006). More ›

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Chancery Addresses Indemnification Rights Following CEO’s Partial Success On Underlying Claims, Including Success Based on Technicalities

Evans v. Avande, Inc. , C. A. No. 2018-0454-LWW (Del. Ch. Sept. 23, 2021)
The departure of a company’s CEO was contentious. After his termination, the company filed an action in the Court of Chancery, alleging that the CEO had breached his duty of loyalty, sought a declaratory judgment that his removal was valid and effective, and further asserted claims for tortious interference, defamation, and conversion against the CEO. After trial, the Court concluded that the CEO had breached his duty of loyalty but that the company had failed to brief, and therefore had waived, its claims for declaratory judgment, tortious interference, defamation, and conversion. On the basis of mandatory indemnification rights in the company’s charter and bylaws, the CEO filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery seeking indemnification for his fees incurred defending against the company’s suit. More ›

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Chancery Finds Adversity Between Directors and Formation of Special Committee Shields Against Production of Company-Privileged Information

In re: Howard Midstream Energy Partners, LLC, C.A. No. 2021-0487-LWW (Del. Ch. Sept. 22, 2021)
Issues of corporate privilege among directors entail a fact-specific analysis when a dispute arises among them. Here, the Court of Chancery considered a motion to compel brought by former directors and officers who claimed they were “ambushed” in a corporate “coup.” Because the directors should have considered themselves adverse to the corporation, and because a special committee was formed to deal with the petitioners’ potential separation from the company, the Court denied the petitioners’ motion to compel communications between the other directors and the company withheld as privileged.  More ›

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Chancery Applies Recent Zuckerberg Decision and Holds That Demand Was Not Excused

Genworth Fin., Inc. Consol. Deriv. Litig., C.A. No. 11901-VCS (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2021)
In a demand futility analysis, Delaware courts have traditionally applied the Rales and Aronson decisions. However, the Delaware Supreme Court recently adopted the Zuckerberg test. Under this new three-part test, Delaware courts ask: (1) whether the director received a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct of the litigation demand; (2) whether the director would face a substantial likelihood of liability on any of the claims that are the subject of the litigation demand; and (3) whether the director lacks independence from someone who received a material benefit from the alleged misconduct that is the subject of the litigation demand or who would face a substantial likelihood of liability on any of the claims that are subject to the litigation demand. More ›

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Chancery Addresses Records Custodian Discovery Dispute

Fortis Advisors LLC v. Johnson & Johnson, et al., C.A. No. 2021-0881-LWW (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 2021)
Initial productions may raise new issues, including whether additional custodial collections might be necessary. While the bar for discoverability generally is low, the work and cost involved in collecting, processing, and analyzing data may be significant, and discovery demands may be disproportionate to the needs of the case. Delaware courts balance these important interests when faced with questions regarding the appropriate scope of discovery. More ›

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Chancery Declines to Award Damages Equivalent to Contractual Dissociation Remedy Under Partnership Agreement

In re Cellular Telephone Partnership Litigation, Coordinated C.A. No. 6885-VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2021)
Plaintiffs held a minority interest in a partnership owned and controlled by AT&T. In 2010, AT&T implemented a transaction causing the partnership to transfer its assets to an affiliate, freezing out the plaintiffs. In connection with the freeze out, plaintiffs received $4.1 million—their pro rata share of the $219 million that AT&T paid to the partnership. Plaintiffs later brought an action in the Court of Chancery alleging that by implementing the transaction, AT&T breached the partnership agreement on a number of different bases. More ›

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In Unusual Circumstances, Chancery Declines to Stay Discovery Pending Motion to Dismiss

Edward Deane, et al. v. Robert Maginn, Jr., C.A. No. 2017-0346-LWW (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2021)
Delaware courts often grant a motion to stay discovery pending the resolution of a potentially case-dispositive motion to dismiss. In “[t]he unique circumstances of this case,” however, the Court of Chancery denied a stay. The court focused on the parties’ responsibility to adhere to the discovery schedule to which they previously agreed. More ›

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Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Contractual Waiver of Statutory Appraisal Rights

Manti Holdings, LLC, et al. v. Authentix Acquisition Co., Inc., No. 354, 2020 (Del. Sept. 13, 2021)
This decision arose out of the acquisition of Authentix Acquisition Company, Inc. and a subsequent appraisal proceeding brought by dissenting stockholders under 8 Del. C. § 262. As a condition of an earlier merger involving the private equity firm Carlyle, the petitioners were parties to a stockholders agreement binding the corporation and all of its stockholders that purported to waive the stockholders’ statutory appraisal rights. At the trial court level, the Court of Chancery enforced the contractual waiver and granted the company’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, alongside other contentions, the petitioners argued that statutory appraisal rights are one of the fundamental features of corporate identity and should be found nonwaivable under Delaware law and public policy. More ›

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CCLD Rejects Several Defenses to Insurance Coverage of a Settlement Paid By Investment Fund

Sycamore Partners Management, L.P. v. Endurance American Insurance Co., C.A. No. N18C-09-211 AML CCLD (Del. Super. Sept. 10, 2021)
Prior to the closing of a leveraged buyout of a company (the “Merger”) whereby the plaintiff investment fund sought to divest, liquidate, and resell some of the company’s high-value assets (the “Restructuring Transactions”), the company’s stockholders brought derivative claims against the company’s board relating to the voting process underlying the Merger. The company settled the Merger-related claims, the Merger closed, and the plaintiff executed the Restructuring Transactions. Shortly thereafter, company bondholders sought information from the company—which the company never provided—regarding whether the Merger and Restructuring Transactions violated an indenture between the bondholders and the company.  More ›

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Chancery Addresses Indemnification Claim Turning on the Contractual Definition of a Covered Person

GMF ELCM Fund L.P., et al. v. ELCM HCRE GP LLC, et al., C.A. No. 2018-0840-SG (Del. CH. Sept. 22, 2021)
This indemnification dispute arose out of an alternative entity dissolution proceeding involving a health care business. The claimant was a former employee of an entity within the web of entities implicated in the case. He sought indemnification from several entities for his defense of third-party claims in a separate litigation, from which he was dismissed. After the liquidating trustee objected to his claim, the claimant sought to enforce his rights in the Delaware dissolution proceeding. More ›

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Chancery Dismisses Derivative Claims That Private Equity Sponsors Comprised A Control Group

Patel v. Duncan, C.A. No. 2020-0418-MTZ (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2021)
For stockholders to comprise a control group, the alleged group members must be connected in some “legally significant way – such as by contract, common ownership, agreement or another arrangement – to work together toward a shared goal.” Sheldon v. Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P., 220 A.3d 245, 251-52 (Del. 2019). There must be “an indication of an actual agreement, although it need not be formal or written.” Id. Here, the court dismissed a claim alleging that two private equity funds comprised a control group that agreed to cause the corporation to engage in two unfair, self-interested transactions as a quid pro quo arrangement between them. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged they agreed to cause the corporation to overpay in two successive transactions in which the counterparties who benefitted unfairly were affiliates of the respective private equity funds.  More ›

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Chancery Examines Cornerstone Standard for Establishing Non-Exculpated Fiduciary Duty Claims

In Re BGC Partners, Inc. Derivative Litigation, Consol. C.A. No. 2018-0722-LWW (Del. Ch. Sep. 20, 2021)
A director protected by an exculpatory provision is entitled to dismissal in a breach of fiduciary duty action unless the plaintiff advances a non-exculpated claim. Under In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 115 A.3d 1173 (Del. 2015), to establish a non-exculpated claim plaintiff must show that a director: (1) “harbored self-interest adverse to the stockholders’ interests”; (2) “acted to advance the self-interest of an interested party from whom they could not be presumed to act independently”; or (3) “acted in bad faith.” This decision explains Cornerstone’s second prong. More ›

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